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Family Background and School Choice in Cities of Russia and 
Estonia: Selective Agenda of the Soviet Past and Present
Kaire Põder*, Triin Lauri, Valeria Ivaniushina & Daniel Alexandrov
Abstract 
In this article, we demonstrate the size of family background eff ects in various regions of Russia and 
Estonia, concentrating on urban and rural diff erences, addressing the idea that the family background 
eff ect is moderated by school level admission policies. Having common path-dependent educational 
institutions from the communist period, the countries diff er in both the extensiveness of the welfare 
state and system level school choice policies. However, we see many commonalities in both systems, 
especially at the urban school level. The family background eff ect is defi ned as the dependence of student 
achievement on family background characteristics, such as parental education, income and social status. 
In operationalising family background, the number of books at home and parental education are used as 
proxies, and its eff ect is measured as a percentage of the individual level PISA 2012 score. We contribute 
to the literature by studying school choice, its key characteristics and moderating eff ects by school level 
admission policy in an urban environment.
Keywords: PISA data, school choice, admission policy, education policy, Estonia, Russia.
Introduction
We are motivated by the fact that there is increasing evidence that both our post-communist case 
countries — Russia and Estonia — have grown increasingly unequal over the last decades, while social 
intergenerational mobility has decreased (Kosyakova, 2016; Helemäe, 2011; Saar, 2010; Strenze, 2006; 
Gerber & Hout, 2004). One explanation is that due to technological innovation and globalisation, 
modern economies benefi t the better skilled and educated, increasing income gaps while hindering 
intergenerational income elasticity. However, there is also a theory that the increasingly selective 
modern educational policy agenda creates more inequality of opportunity by allowing family 
background eff ects to work through multiple channels, i.e., the ability to choose, human capital, and 
class/peer composition (in the case of early tracking and ability grouping). In our paper, we control for 
the latter theoretical arguments, meaning that our theoretical and empirical grounds rest on school 
choice literature.
The most hotly disputed debates in educational policy in the last twenty years have undoubtedly 
been those centred on the autonomy or decentralisation of decision-making power, accountability, 
tracking and parental choice (Wössmann et al., 2009). The main rationale behind these modernising 
initiatives is that they have the ability to compel traditional education systems to improve through 
competitive pressures. This improvement is often defi ned, at least in empirical works, as effi  ciency 
and measured as performance through either national or international standardised tests (Wössmann 
et al., 2009; Betts & Roemer, 2007). However, school choice and related initiatives are also issues that 
split educational researchers; opponents argue that effi  ciency comes at the price of equity, apparent 
in the increase of the eff ect of socio-economic background in educational outcomes within choice-
* E-mail of corresponding author: kaire.poder@ttu.ee
STSS Vol 8 / Issue 3
Studies of Transition States and Societies
5
6 Kaire Põder , Triin Lauri,  Valeria Ivaniushina, Daniel Alexandrov
tolerant systems. Many cases, such as those seen in Germany (Riedel et al., 2009), in various US 
cities (Cullen et al., 2000), England (West, 2006; West & Ylönen, 2010; Burgess & Briggs, 2010), and 
even increasingly in Finland (Poikolainen, 2012; Seppänen, 2003; Kalalahti et al., 2014), demonstrate 
that choice tends to gather children from better socio-economic backgrounds into certain schools, 
creating not only positive peer eff ects, but also negative externalities for the rest of the children. 
Therefore, the question of the eff ect of school choice on educational effi  ciency and equity continues 
to be at the heart of empirical studies on school choice.
Thus, we are interested in effi  ciency and equity trade-off s in diff erent settings, namely rural 
and urban school systems in Russia and Estonia. Specifi cally, we ask whether family background 
eff ects (FBE) diff er by rural and urban region in Estonia and Russia. FBEs are generally defi ned as 
the dependency of students’ educational outcomes on parents’ backgrounds, i.e., education, wealth, 
social status and the like. We use a unidimensional measure for family background, justifi ed by our 
estimation technique. Moreover, motivated by the mixed results from school choice literature and 
path-dependent institutional frames of both post-Soviet countries, we are interested in how much the 
rural-urban diff erence in FBEs is explained by school level admission policy and the kind of admission 
policies (also termed ‘school choice policy’) moderating FBEs. 
The school choice policy dimension in our paper allows the addition of empirical evidence from 
post-Soviet education systems to the literature on school choice. As indicated, the key paradigmatic 
shift has been toward the competitive stance in education, which among other instruments also 
promotes selectivity and tracking.  In post-communist education systems, tracking and admission 
by academic records or testing have been implicitly (or in some cases more explicitly) used for some 
decades. Historically, these policies were initiated by the national drive for more specialisation 
and, moreover, for academic excellence in natural sciences. The long tradition of selectivity is now 
supported by the OECD policy platform, which makes these two countries interesting testing platforms 
for demonstrating the eff ect of ability grouping in school systems where it has been exercised for a 
long time.
Our estimation technique is as follows. First, we measure the mean sizes of the FBEs within 
diff erent school districts (urban and rural) in Russia and Estonia. We have chosen these countries 
because of common system level similarities inherited from the Soviet era, resting on a comprehensive 
system with some selectivity created by specialised schools. We give the narrative of the emergence 
of selectivity and school choice in the late 1970s in the Soviet Union and highlight major changes 
during the last decades. We explore some peculiarities of our case countries’ school choice policies, 
allowing us to distinguish between the more explicit selectivity path in Russia and the implicit and 
more arbitrary one in Estonia, which infl uence the implemented school level admission policies. Our 
main concern is to see whether these school level admission policies aff ect FBE, as well as what 
kind of institutional practices are prevalent and whether they moderate FBEs. We are driven by the 
assumption that balanced school choice policy is not only dependent on system (country) level policy, 
but on school level institutional execution of the admission policy. In other words, the principles or 
theoretical model underlying policy decisions at national level rarely, if ever, translate into policy 
practice in a direct or pristine form (Ball, 1998, p. 126). These practices are rather the function of 
complex relationships between ideas that take place between and within diff erent levels of actors — at 
state, municipal and school levels. 
We use a comparative micro-econometric study based on disaggregated data. We have four levels 
of research units: individual, school, region (urban or rural) and country. At all levels, we use data 
from the 2012 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). At an individual level, we show 
what percentage of standardised educational performance scores correlates to family background 
(FB) features. We use a range of single or multidimensional features to study these eff ects. Finally, 
we use books at home and parental education as proxies to operationalise FB. For the econometric 
technique, we use country  and region fi xed eff ects with school clustered robust standard errors. 
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Our article is constructed as follows. Following the introduction, the second section outlines the 
tracking and school choice policy literature motivating our research strategy and, thus, synthesises 
mostly empirical results from interdisciplinary standpoints. Section three describes the common 
history of the educational systems of our cases, Russia and Estonia, and gives case specifi cs for model 
specifi cation and interpretation of the results. Then we describe our data and provide regression 
results. Finally, in the fi fth section, we provide conclusions and discuss limitations and policy 
implications.
Premises from school choice literature
One of the distinguishing concepts between the various initiatives of school choice policies is 
whether the policy aims 1) to improve the ‘market’ environment by levelling access to both publicly 
and privately operated schools by publicly funding private schools; or 2) to create a market within 
the public system. The latter, often also called a quasi-market (Le Grand, 2007), indicating that by 
abolishing assignment to residential schools the opportunity for parents to choose creates a market-
like situation, where parents are on the demand side and schools are on the supply side. The empirical 
attempts in the literature to measure the effi  ciency of these various school choice initiatives include a 
list of key explanatory institutional aspects for the analysis: share of private ownership and funding of 
the school, school autonomy and accountability mechanisms (Wössmann et al. 2009; Wise, 2015). The 
equity concern adds the aspect of tracking, i.e. tracking is, among others, one of the key dimensions of 
school choice policies, which determines whether a policy is equity enhancing or not (Lauri & Põder, 
2013).
In countries where private schooling has a long tradition, school choice initiatives have had 
strong equity concerns (Gorard et al., 2003). In others, policy developments in education and more 
specifi cally school choice were usually triggered by the wave of education decentralisation as part of a 
bigger movement in New Public Management (NPM) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In this context, 
the problem of school choice points to the reforms that gave parents the right to infl uence decisions 
concerning the allocation of pupils to public sector schools. This development is usually driven by 
a market based ideology that assumes increased competition will generate the incentives that will 
improve schools’ and children’s achievement (Le Grand, 2007). Since the 1990s many OECD countries 
have increased the extent of choice, and nowadays initial geographical assignment is frequently 
accompanied by more fl exible choice options in most OECD countries (OECD, 2011). Therefore, there 
is no clear evidence from the literature for the claim that private providers improve the achievement 
of schools. However, recent research has shown that public operation has a negative eff ect, but 
public funding of private or denominational schools has a positive eff ect on student achievement 
(Wössmann et al., 2009).
Autonomy has been argued to be the institutional aspect of school choice that enables school 
responsiveness (Wise, 2015). However, school autonomy alone does not necessarily imply better 
educational outcomes, but rather together with accountability (Wise, 2015; Lauri & Põder, 2013). Thus, 
serving as a complement to autonomy, accountability might support school choice by improving 
parental access to information on school options as well as applying additional pressure on schools to 
perform better and thereby increase competition. However, tightened pressure and public listings of 
test results may have devastating results in terms of educational equity, as schools have incentives to 
select students, leading to a phenomenon often approached as tracking. 
According to Brunello and Checchi (2007, p. 784), school systems are characterised by tracking 
when pupils are allocated, at some stage of their career between primary and tertiary school, to 
diff erent tracks, which usually diff er by the curriculum off ered as well as in the average cognitive 
talent of enrolled students. There are explicitly tracking based systems (such as Germany, for instance) 
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and others in which tracking takes place within a comprehensive system. In the former, tracking 
takes the form of well-defi ned separate segments in the education process, typically specialising in 
general and vocational education. In the latter, the selection process is usually less overt (see for 
instance Nikolai and West (2013) on tracking systems in Germany and United Kingdom). Insofar as 
allocation to tracks is non-random, school tracking introduces selection into the schooling process, 
which may take several forms, ranging from self-selection to admission based on a test or on teachers’ 
recommendations. In most cases, selection is aff ected, directly or indirectly, by family background, 
i.e., tracking enforces the role of parental privilege and, therefore, is detrimental to educational 
equity (Brunello & Checchi, 2007). This may occur for several reasons, including peer eff ects (more 
talented or motivated students are gathered together), teacher sorting (teachers prefer to teach more 
motivated students), and diff erences in curricula or in resource endowment (p. 782).
The main argument for tracking is that homogeneous classrooms permit a focused curriculum 
and appropriately paced instruction that leads to maximum learning by all students (Hanushek & 
Wössmann, 2006). However, the arguments for and against tracking become more complicated 
once possible peer eff ects are taken into account, because the precise nature of any interaction then 
becomes a key element in considering tracking, and there is considerable uncertainty about the impact 
of tracking on both the level and distribution of schooling outcomes (Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006).
In some countries with a single-track education system, like Estonia and Russia, admission policy 
mostly aff ects school beginners (primary school level), but there are also countries, either single- or 
multi-track states, where choice starts from lower secondary schools (the so-called Year 11 tests in 
England or the selection of track after Grade 4 in Germany). According to many empirical works on 
tracking (Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006; Brunello & Checchi 2007), the earlier the tracking takes place, 
the more harmful in terms of educational equity it is. The educational reforms of the last thirty years 
have been shaping the educational landscape of European countries and the distinctions between 
explicit and implicit tracking are not so clear-cut. From one side, more autonomous schools and 
open enrolment systems have reduced the school systems’ dependency on geographical assignment 
in comprehensive and/or one-track systems. From the other side, there have been several attempts 
to reform multitrack systems to increase the integration between tracks (Edelstein & Nikolai, 2013).   
Despite the wider institutional contexts — more explicit or implicit tracking — there are diff erent 
choice schemes such as changing catchment areas, establishing criteria for schools to select their 
children, or making criteria more fl exible. Our focus is on the admission criteria and policies of 
schools to see whether there is an empirical case that, independently of system level tracking policies, 
socioeconomically advantaged families can better realise their choice opportunities (see also Exley, 
2013; West, 2006; West et al., 2011).
Our empirical analysis is based on the assumption that early tracking is harmful (Braga et al., 2013; 
Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006) and to mitigate the detrimental eff ect of parental decision-making, 
centrally steered admission policies (choice policies) are advisable (Cobb & Glass, 2009; Musset, 2012). 
A centrally steered choice policy or so-called controlled choice emphasises the central criteria and 
equity enhancement, whereas in cases where schools have considerable autonomy in designing 
admission criteria and allow academic record or ability test-based intakes, problems with educational 
equity grow. The importance of central criteria (proximity, siblings, the preference of disadvantaged 
groups, etc.) in school admission policies in the area is related to the avoidance of cream-skimming 
(Le Grand, 2007; Musset 2012). The problem of cream-skimming is not only prevalent in pro-choice 
countries. There is evidence (Hirsch, 2002; Seppänen, 2003; Põder et al., 2013) that in the case of 
regulated choice and/or catchment-based assignment, there are some open enrolment schools that 
are over-subscribed and highly selective. However, school choice is largely an urban phenomenon, 
as in rural areas there is often no more than one school nearby and educational decision-making by 
families has no such eff ect on school allocation, thereby justifying our division between urban and 
rural schools.
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We proceed by describing the emergence of choice agendas and selectivity, in our case the 
selection of countries, and determine the key dimensions of school choice policies in these countries 
— the share of private providers, autonomy, accountability and tracking — infl uencing the selectivity 
of their admission policies.
Emergence of choice agendas in post-Soviet schools
In the USSR, the education system was unifi ed, centralised, state controlled and effi  cient — literacy 
levels in the Soviet Union were among the highest in the world. In principle, in the post-WWII period, 
the soviet school system was uniform and schools off ered exactly the same curriculum, approved by 
the Ministry of Education. In reality, though, school quality diff ered, and these diff erences in school 
quality mainly depended on teachers’ availability and qualifi cations. There were better schools with 
highly qualifi ed staff  in the central areas of metropolitan cities and understaff ed schools in rural or 
industrial areas. 
In the 1960s, the diff erentiation of schools was formally recognised, and a new category was 
introduced — so-called ‘specialised schools’ with enhanced curricula in modern languages or in physics 
and mathematics. In 1962, four boarding schools focusing on physics and mathematics education 
were opened in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev and Novosibirsk. There were other schools in major 
cities with specialisations in one particular language (English, French, German, and in some cases 
Spanish and other languages) or in mathematics and natural sciences. 
The emergence of ‘specialised schools’ with enhanced curricula in modern languages was due to 
the demand of Soviet elites (party elite and professionals) for language education for their children. 
Schools with enhanced curricula in math and physics were all organised by academic elites, their 
existence justifi ed by considerations of national security and the need for R&D in the Cold War. They 
were established only in major cities, and their numbers grew gradually, but even after twenty-
fi ve years of growth, by the end of the 1980s they accounted for only 14% of specialised enhanced 
curriculum schools in Moscow, even less in St. Petersburg, and far less around the rest of the USSR, 
including Estonia. Language schools were formally open for admission to all children, but in reality 
were mainly attended by the children of party and bureaucratic elites and those of highly educated 
professionals. Maths/physics schools admitted children based on ability testing or based on the results 
of ‘Math Olympiads’.
Selective agenda since the 90s: Russia
At the time of Perestroika (1985-1991), education was at the forefront of changes. Everybody wanted 
better schools, the ideas of democratic education were very appealing on all levels of the society, and 
the rhetoric of democratic schools vs. totalitarian schools was important in the wide opposition to 
the Soviet legacy and in the global transformation of social, economic, and political life in the Soviet 
Union.
In 1988, the All-Union Congress of School Workers demanded wide reforms, mainly liberation and 
diversifi cation of the state-controlled standardised system. In 1991, the Decree on Education allowed 
for the legal diff erentiation of schools. One of the principles of the new reform was the pluralism of 
education, the existence of alternative schools and curricula. Important principles of the educational 
reform were announced, including the abolition of the state monopoly and decentralised governance, 
allowing for private schools, the autonomy of schools and the right of teachers to choose their own 
pedagogical style, educational technology, textbooks and teaching aids, and, last yet most relevant 
for this particular article, the right of students to choose schools and profi les of education (Dneprov, 
2006, pp. 58-60).
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The changes came quickly: in 1985-86 in Moscow, 86% schools were off ering the standard 
curriculum (in other cities even more), while only 14% were specialised, mainly in languages. Yet 
by 1993-94, in Moscow only 17% of schools claimed to off er the standard curriculum, while others 
claimed some specialisation: 18% old-type specialised schools (focused on languages and humanities), 
2% gymnasiums, and 63% schools that announced new diverse curricula (Cherednichenko, 2000).
Private schools are very rare in Russia. In 2010, private schools comprised only 1.5% of all schools 
(about 750 private schools out of a total of about 48,800 schools; see also Table 2), but students in 
private schools represented about 0.4% of the total student population, as private schools are usually 
small (Nikolaev and Chugunov, 2012). Private schools are mostly concentrated in major cities, where 
there are many more families willing and able to pay for private school education. In St. Petersburg, 
there are 19 private schools (out of 770 schools in the city).
Thus, as opposed to general education schools with a standard curriculum, there are schools 
with intensive learning programs (‘specialised schools’ with enhanced curricula for one or several 
school subjects), lyceums and gymnasiums. The last two types of schools have enhanced curricula 
either in applied and natural sciences (lyceums) or in languages and humanities and social sciences 
(gymnasiums). Statistics for the whole country are as follows: 2% lyceums, 3% gymnasiums, 15% 
specialised enhanced curriculum schools (NORRIC, 2005; Nikolaev and Chugunov, 2012). In St. 
Petersburg, the share of enhanced curriculum schools is larger: 8.5% lyceums, 10.4% gymnasiums, 
and 19% specialised schools. In total, enhanced curriculum schools comprise approximately 38% of St. 
Petersburg city schools.1 However, ability testing for entrance is prohibited, making comparisons with 
other multi-tier systems diffi  cult.
The Unifi ed State Examination (USE) enacted in 2008 became mandatory for all students graduating 
high school and intensifi ed the policy of external accountability. USE is widely used for comparing 
school quality; in St. Petersburg, schools are obliged to make USE results public. The diff erence 
between the USE results by school type is pronounced: in the 1st USE quartile, there are schools with 
the standard curriculum, while in the 4th quartile, there are gymnasiums, lyceums and specialised 
schools (2nd and 3rd quartiles comprise all school types).
In contemporary Russia, parents have the right to apply to any school they prefer; there is no 
obligation to go to the nearest school. School admission tests for primary school entrance (at the age 
of 7) are forbidden by law, and admission to school is on a fi rst-come-fi rst-served basis. If there are 
more applications than places in the school, there are preferences for some categories of students. 
The rules regarding which categories have preferences constantly change. For example, until 2005 
there were no preferences for families living in the vicinity of the school, but later, preference was 
given to those who live in the proximity of a school (within 500 meters), with siblings in the school, 
who attended a kindergarten attached to the school, who attended preparatory courses at the school, 
with disabilities, who have a parent in the military, etc.
Most students stay in the same school from 1st class to graduation. This means that parental choice 
implemented at the entrance in primary school shapes the educational chances of a child for years, 
so the school choice policy of Russia can be considered as one based on early tracking and, therefore, 
harmful in terms of educational inequality (Braga et al., 2013; Hanushek & Wössmann, 2006). In terms 
of the other key dimensions, school choice policy in Russia can be characterised as pro-choice, i.e., the 
parental discretion to choose the school for their child is enabled and the choice takes mainly place 
within the public system, which nevertheless has become diverse in terms of diff erent tiers. At the 
same time, admission tests are prohibited. In addition, school autonomy in terms of admission and 
curricula is moderately high and accountability is based on standardised testing and comparisons.
1 Komitet po Obrazovaniju Pravitelstva Sankt-Peterburga, see http://k-obr.spb.ru.
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Selective agenda since 90s: Estonia
Since Gorbachev’s perestroika in the mid-1980s, several attempts were made to establish a renewed 
Estonian system of education. This period can be characterised as the era of heated debates and 
brainstorming concerning educational principles and foundations (Kull & Trasberg, 2006). However, 
no explicit turn toward selectivity or choice can be distinguished. Rather, there was an inevitable 
transfer period when many educational institutions originating from the Soviet system (such as the 
general education curriculum, school legislation, etc.) were formally still in force while at the same 
time Western educational ideas were pouring in. The success of policy learning attempts varied. 
According to Toots (2009), some attempts failed (implementation of strategic planning, comprehensive 
legislation reform), some succeeded without revision (national exams), and some were altered during 
the reform process (curriculum). Despite the Finnish experience — which was the main source of 
policy learning (ibid.) — the infl uence of international organisations and neoliberal thoughts took 
hold. However, the share of private schools is still modest (see also Table 2).   
Thus, despite the lack of a decisive turn toward school choice, the ‘inherited’ system became 
more diverse. This selectivity emerged within the offi  cial comprehensive schooling system and was 
the result of the increased autonomy of municipalities and schools in designing their own admission 
policies. Schools have substantial autonomy over the design of admission procedures in the case of 
oversubscription. Starting from 1993, there have simultaneously been inter- and intra-district school 
practices in place. In inter-district schools, parents received the right to apply to a school outside of 
the catchment area. Thus, the specialist character of some schools has been maintained by reinforcing 
historically specialised schools by granting them inter-district selective admission. These schools are 
located mainly in urban areas (see descriptive statistics in Table 2). This distinction between inter- and 
intra-district schools follows the pattern of over- and under-demanded schools, which creates the 
opportunity to select students. So, even if there is neither offi  cial tracking nor ability grouping in the 
Estonian single-track school system, the selection is usually justifi ed by a specialisation track. 
The divide between schools with historically strong reputations (selective schools hereinafter) 
and local (regular) schools has been enforced for decades. This split by reputational capital takes 
place within the public sector, and there are no private institutions among these selective schools. 
For example, eight out of 56 schools in the capital city of Tallinn apply entrance exams for school 
beginners. Images of the ‘good’ and ‘less good’ schools are enforced by the so-called league tables. 
These league tables report listings of the schools by average national fi nal examination results. 
Selective public schools triumph there in the top positions. While recent legal changes have tried to 
increase the importance of school proximity and siblings in school assignment, they have not changed 
the admission policies of oversubscribed schools, leaving the admission policy of elementary schools 
a decentralised issue. 
The decentralised admission policy is applied by the selective schools without explicit procedures. 
All these schools use entrance tests for school starters (7 years old) and children are pre-trained 
in prep schools, where children are basically drilled for tests. Põder and Lauri (2014) showed that 
approximately 70% of the children who have started their schooling in one of the schools in the 
capital city during 2008-2011 participated in at least one of the prep schools. Furthermore, spaces in 
selective prep schools are limited, distributed by competition on a fi rst-come-fi rst-served basis.
However, the situation is rather diff erent in rural areas, where for most families there is only one 
school in the area (see also Table 2 on schools’ competition) and schools are in trouble with their 
budgets, as the enrolment of rural schools has fallen dramatically (Põder et al., 2014). There is also 
concern from a governmental level, as one of the conclusions from the latest PISA survey is that a 
considerable statistical diff erence exists between schools in rural and city areas. This concern has 
partly driven the secondary school reform initiated recently, which aims to increase the government’s 
responsibility in upper secondary education. However, another statistical diff erence and educational 
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gap — the diff erence between selective and non-selective schools, also distinguishable according 
to latest PISA (see for instance Lindemann (2015)) — has not received considerable attention by the 
government.
In general, the school choice policy in Estonia can be described as one of implicit or hidden choice, 
where the offi  cial educational agenda favours comprehensive, neighbourhood schooling, but includes 
public schools that are highly selective. As these schools test, among others, school beginners at 6 
to 7 years of age, this system may be considered to be an early tracking system. The private share of 
schooling is moderate. Schools have considerable autonomy in terms of content and admission, and 
the external accountability mechanisms are visible and emphasised by the so-called league tables. 
Analysis
Stemming from empirical and theoretical literature, our empirical strategy is the following. First, we 
describe our data and reveal the gap between urban and rural school level admission and tracking 
practices and outcomes in both countries. Second, we reveal our background characteristic estimation 
strategy (empirical data) and argue the pros and cons of estimation techniques based on various 
SES proxies such as parental education or occupational status, home possessions such as books or 
educational resources in general, or some other factor variables composed by the PISA team, i.e., 
family wealth, parental occupational status or socio-economic status. However, being familiar with 
the complex nature of FB, we started from the PISA data by operationalising the family background. 
Multidimensional measures of FB are preferred by many authors who empirically show (De Graaf 
et al., 2000; Jaeger & Holm 2007) or theoretically argue (Bourdieu, 1984; Ball et al. 1995; Sullivan, 
2001; 2007) that educational paths and trajectories of students are largely determined by cultural 
capital at home. Still, in addition to our data-driven approach to FB we have some support from 
literature, which argues that using books as a proxy grasps the multidimensional nature of the FB 
well. It has been argued (see Schütz et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2010; Põder et al., 2016) that books are a 
preferred indicator for showing the impact of various family inputs, such as family contributions to 
education, cultural capital of families, and their preferences in education, especially in inter-country 
research. Moreover, similarly to the concept of cultural capital in sociological education literature, 
Fuchs and Wössmann (2007) show that books at home are the only and most signifi cant predictor 
of student performance that combines these various impacts from educational, income-based and 
social background information. As a limiting factor, it may be argued that books lose their relevance 
in use due to increased usage of the internet and digital devices. We agree that this might infl uence 
the number and importance of books at home; however, for our analytical purposes, books are not an 
instrument for explaining educational profi ciency, but rather books still integrate a multidimensional 
measure of cultural capital into a one-dimensional proxy. Thus, our estimation strategy is to use 
‘number of books at home’ as a proxy for FB as far as it is a statistically signifi cant measure, meaning 
as far as it is supported by empirics.
Descriptive statistics
The PISA dataset allows the use of various measures for estimating the individual level of educational 
effi  ciency — profi ciency in mathematics, reading or science. We use the PISA standardised reading 
scores as our dependent variables, and the actual score values can be seen in Appendix 1. Our 
independent variables originate from the student and school questionnaires and, thus, we distinguish 
school and individual (student) level variables (Table 1). Most of our data is categorical or index-based. 
We also use many dummies as controls. We concentrate on FBE, so many individual level variables 
are treated as controls and their eff ect sizes are not reported in the analysis. At the school level, we 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the dataset
Variable  
No. of 
observ-
ations
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dependent variable  
s_read (standardised PISA reading score) 10010 0.0000 1.0000 -4.36981 2.989491
Family background characteristics  
books (number of books at home) 9873 3.374861 1.373208 1 6
escs
(index of economic, social and cultural 
status)
9910 .0301231 .7783789 –4.04 3.69
fi sced (educational level of father) 9008 1.877664 .8831589 0 3
hedres (home educational resources) 9916 .3457412 .8888281 –3.93 1.12
hisced
(educational level of higher educated 
parent)
9847 2.194272 .8364874 0 3
hisei
(highest occupational status of 
parents)
9654 52.20757 21.0699 11.01 88.96
wealth (index of family wealth) 9936 –.4608202 .8276806 –3.94 3.02
homepos (index of home posessions) 9939 –.0622548 .8486095 –4.44 4.01
misced (educational level of mother) 9796 2.018477 .8950922 0 3
pared (parental years of schooling) 9847 14.01351 1.724152 6 16
Personal control variables  
gender (male=1) 10010 .4982018 .5000217 0 1
age_at_isced1 (age of starting school) 9827 6.758421 .5170107 4 9
lang_athome (home language, native=1) 9852 .9282379 .2581067 0 1
immig (immigrant status=1) 9802 .096919 .2958625 0 1
testlang
(test language same as state offi  cial 
language)
9995 .9006503 .2991459 0 1
School level variables  
sc_owner (school ownership, private=1) 10321 .0194749 .1381935 0 1
sc_pubfi n (% of public fi nancing at school) 9617 96.78823 8.683825 35 100
sc_feefi n (% of fi nancing by private fees) 9489 1.300885 6.837257 0 61.1
sc_location
(school location: village, small town, 
town, city, big city)
10010 2.993806 1.244174 1 5
sc_competition
(school competition, competing to 
how many schools)
10010 1.414186 .7975626 0 2
sc_assessment (external assessment of the schools) 9965 .7930758 .4051211 0 1
sc_achievment
(school achievement results posted 
publicly)
9914 .5921929 .4914518 0 1
sc_achiev_~d
(school track students by 
achievement)
10010 .8922078 .3101333 0 1
sc_parenta~e
(school with parental involvment in 
administration (voice))
9976 .9218123 .6859137 0 2
sc_admission
(school using academic record in 
admission)
9995 .9018509 .8096078 0 2
schsize
(school size=number of students at 
school)
9816 636.5139 358.696 5 3242
Note: for country specifi c descriptive statistics see Appendix 2
Source: authors’ compilation
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focus on various practices and policies related to school choice literature, such as revenue sources 
(fi nancing), accountability (assessment, league tables, parental involvement), competition between 
schools and admission practices.
We pay attention to school level policy variables (Table 2) and their variability between two 
countries and the rural-urban dichotomy to indicate diff erences in school level practices. We make 
discrete cuts in the categorical school questionnaire indicator of the community size where the school 
is located in 100 000 habitants. So in our analysis, urban indicates community sizes bigger than 100 
000 inhabitants.
Looking at Table 2, we see that in both cases the share of private schools and private money in 
fi nancing school is marginal, as was already indicated in Section 3. There are also similarities in school 
competition and school sizes. However, in Russian schools, external steering, including league tables, 
is much more common, while in Estonia there is more admission based on merit (achievement). This 
is prohibited in Russia.
Our conclusion is that on the school level, Russian and Estonian schools are diff erent — there is 
more external control and more explicit tracking in Russia, whereas there is more academic record 
(aptitude tests) based intake and competition between schools in Estonia.
Figure 1 illustrates the eff ect of admission policy in highlighting that schools’ opportunity to 
admit by academic record comes together with higher scores, i.e., cream-skimming. Technically, there 
is a statistical diff erence between Estonia’s rural and urban mean scores at the 95% level (policy 
sometimes). There is a diff erence between Estonia’s rural and urban mean scores only at the 90% level 
(policy never), and in other cases diff erences are statistically signifi cant at the 99% level. The latter 
indicates that in Russia the diff erence between rural and urban scores is stronger, independently of 
the type of school level admission policy, whereas in all cases the diff erences in urban and rural scores 
seem to be driven by or at least correlated with admission policy (i.e., admission by academic record).
Table 2: Execution of school level policies in two countries
 Russian Estonian
 Urban Rural Urban Rural
% of students in private schools 1% 0% 3%* 4%*
% of total budget fi nanced by general tax revenues 94% 98,8 95,60% 98%
% of total budget fi nanced by fees 3,00% 0,05% 2,21% 0,56%
% of students studing is schools which compete …     
at least with one school 89% 69% 93% 77%
with two or more schools 72% 46% 93% 50%
% of students in schools with national assessment 94%* 93%* 60% 66%
% of students in schools with publicly posted achievement data 85% 73% 54% 30%
% of students in schools which track by achievement 100% 99% 77% 79%
% of students in schools where parents have a lot of voice 31% 12% 19% 17%
% of students in schools which use academic record in admission*** 28% 6% 56% 34%
Average school size (min-max)
868 (163-
3242)
484 (15-
1293)
721(67-
1448)
532(5-
1518)
Average PISA reading score** 499 453 530 512
* No statistically signifi cant diff erence between urban and rural schools in one country
**There is 99% signifi cant results that rural and urban PISA reading scores are diff erent (–24 points) independently 
from the country, but there is also 48 points 99% signifi cant results that countries diff er.
*** From school questionere Q28 — How often is the following factor considered when students are admitted to your 
school: student record of academic performance (including placement test)?
Source: authors’ compilation
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Thus, we hypothesise that school admission policy partially explains the score, but not only — it 
works also through group selection and grouping (cream-skimming) and not so much through explicit 
tracking or management of the school.
Empirical strategy
Our estimation strategy is inspired by the education production function approach that has been 
dominant in literature since the release of the Coleman report in the 1960s, summarised by Hanushek 
(1979). The data and case specifi cities allow us to look separately at four country specifi c regions: (a) 
urban regions in Russia, (b) rural regions in Russia, (c) urban regions in Estonia, and (d) rural regions 
in Estonia. In the statistical model (Equation 1), country-region is specifi ed by j.
Where i indicates individual at the school s from the region j. We explain the average country-
region FBE indicated by β_j and moderated by school admission policy (P
sj
) eff ect indicated by γ
j
. To 
estimated country-region fi xed eff ects, we have region dummies D
j
. The interaction eff ect (B
isj
·D
j
) is 
measured by ε
j
 and itdepicts the eff ect of the random slopes (how FBE diff ers by countries and regions). 
We also add the vector of individual level control variables I
isj
 such as immigrant background, gender, 
age of schooling, language at home, attitudes toward teachers, etc.; and school level control variables 
S_sj such as ownership, fi nancing principles, community profi le, etc. The estimation technique is OLS 
with clustering unit school. Thus, the interpretation of regression results is the following: we measure 
country-region specifi c FBE (β
estonia_rural
+ε
j
) and the impact of the school choice policies γ
j
 to FBE.
By operationalising the empirical model, we face the following challenges: how family background 
works out as a single dimensional measure (for a theoretical discussion see Checchi (2006)) and how it 
could diff er by countries (cultural background); which school level policies operate independently from 
system level context. We treat these questions as empirical ones, meaning that we run estimations 
with all possible variations available in the dataset.
In Table 3, we run 10 diff erent specifi cations of the model based on diff erent operationalisations 
of family background (FB) to see whether we can rule out some measures of the latter. Original 
abbreviations from the dataset have the following meanings (see also Appendix 3 for descriptive 
0 200100 400 600500300
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1
0
Admission by academic record (0—never, 1—sometimes, 2—always)
Russian urban
Russian rural
Estonian urban
Estonian rural
Figure 1: School level admission policy and PISA reading scores by areas
Source: School level admission policy operationalised according to school principal questionnaires in 
PISA 2012
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statistics and mean values of the FB variables). First, hisced, misced, and fi sced indicate highest 
educational categories by the International Standard Classifi cation of Education respectively for 
highest in the family, mother and father. Second, pared measures hisced and is converted into the 
number of years of schooling. Thus, the fi rst three measures are categorical, but pared is continuous. 
Second, books are also a conventional measure indicating the number of books at home in categories 
— from 0-10 to more than 500 (see also Table 1). All the rest of the indicators (hedres, hisei, homepos, 
wealth, escs) are indices composed by the OECD research team by principal component analysis. The 
fi nal index indicating socioeconomic status of the parents (escs) is the broadest and is derived from 
these three indices: the highest occupational status of parents (hisei), pared, and home possessions 
(homepos), which comprises all items on the indices of wealth and hedres, as well as books. Similarly, 
the wealth index is based on the students’ responses on whether they had the following at home: a 
room of their own, a connection to the internet, a dishwasher, a DVD player, and three other country-
specifi c items; also included were their responses on the number of cellular phones, televisions, 
computers, cars and rooms with a bath or shower. The hedres indicator shows the existence of 
educational resources at home, including a desk and a quiet place to study, a computer that students 
can use for schoolwork, educational software, books to help with students’ schoolwork, technical 
reference books and a dictionary. Most of the indices (excluding hisei) are composed so that each 
variable has an OECD mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, meaning that variables are 
standardised, which allows their better interpretation in Table 3.
In general, we see that single-dimensional measures (such as books or hisced) perform relatively 
well compared with many indices. For the purpose of our empirical strategy, we thus prefer the 
operationalisation of family background by single-dimensional (categorical) measures instead of 
indices, because it allows for better interpretation of interactions. All our current estimations assume 
Table 3: Operationalisation of family background. Regressions: country fi xed eff ects with school 
robust standard errors
 hisced misced fi sced pared hedres books hisei homepos wealth escs
FBE (linear 
eff ect) 
0.237*** 0.221*** 0.194*** 0.0988*** 0.165*** 0.201*** 0.0127***   0.172*** 0.0313 0.349***
(0.0173) (0.0157) (0.0168) (0.00763) (0.0126) (0.00974) (0.000621) (0.0165)   (1.83) (18.61)   
russian_
urban 
 0.430*** 0.426*** 0.435*** 0.443*** 0.465*** 0.416*** 0.404***        0.445*** 0.491*** 0.376***
(0.0729) (0.0725) (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.0756) (0.0709) (0.0664)  (0.0740) (6.33) (5.59)   
estonian_
urban
 0.290*** 0.297*** 0.341*** 0.306*** 0.364*** 0.293*** 0.250***        0.336*** 0.377*** 0.235** 
(0.0756) (0.0755) (0.0770) (0.0773) (0.0803) (0.0717) (0.0725)          (0.0792) (4.59) (3.26)   
gender -0.488*** -0.489*** -0.483*** -0.488*** -0.488*** -0.453***  -0.488***      -0.498*** -0.491*** -0.502***
 (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0208) (0.0213) (0.0201) (0.0204)        (0.0212)   (-22.75) (-24.78)   
age_at 
_isced1 
-0.218*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.221*** -0.228*** -0.204***  -0.195***       -0.226*** -0.235*** -0.198***
(0.0268) (0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0261) (0.0252)        (0.0270)   (-8.36) (-7.77)   
lang_
athome 
0.483*** 0.474*** 0.505*** 0.480*** 0.458*** 0.427*** 0.452***        0.459*** 0.495*** 0.435***
(0.0624) (0.0619) (0.0640) (0.0619) (0.0586) (0.0604) (0.0638)         (0.0628)  (7.77) (7.05)   
immig -0.175*** -0.167*** -0.184*** -0.175*** -0.160*** -0.173***  -0.147***       -0.175*** -0.172*** -0.168***
 (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0345) (0.0336) (0.0327) (0.0328) (0 .0311)         (0.0330)  (-5.09) (-5.31)   
testlang 0.627*** 0.630*** 0.640*** 0.612*** 0.617*** 0.533*** 0.510***        0.577*** 0.612*** 0.524***
 (0.0704) (0.0700) (0.0687) (0.0712) (0.0733) (0.0672) (0.0667)           (0.0724) (8.18) (7.90)   
N 9522 9473 8722 9522 9577 9536 9325 9581 9580 9562
R² 0.2019  0.2018  0.1944  0.1948  0.1877  0.2423  0.2359 0.1867 0.1672  0.2360
Notes: dependent variable is standardised PISA 2012 reading score, school robust standard errors in parentheses, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: authors’ compilation
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the linearity of the dependent variables, but in Appendix 4 we have also included nonlinear eff ects, 
showing that only books (more than 500 books) will overrule the assumption of linearity, and thus we 
have recoded our data: 1—0...25 books, 2—26...100 books, 3—101...200 books, 4—more than 200 books.
Results
First, we run regressions without school policy moderating eff ects. The estimation technique makes no 
distinction between the rural areas in the two countries, and thus dummies for the rural areas in both 
countries are included. Eff ects sizes can be interpreted in percentages, because of the standardisation 
of reading scores (it means that in both countries mean score is subtracted from each individual score 
and divided by standard deviation). In Table 4 from the second column we see that in urban Russia, 
background eff ects (indicated by hisced) are approximately 20% higher than in Estonia (and in rural 
Russia). 
Thus, we indicate total eff ects by summing up the following coeffi  cients: for Russian urban 
0.43 (0.211+0.215) and for Estonian urban 0.31 (0.203+0.098). Of course, the latter results indicate 
just empirical regularities from the measurement exercise, and the results suggest that in an urban 
context, system or school level practices aff ect individual abilities diff erently from the rural context. 
We hypothesise that due to diff erences in system level explicit choice policy (selection by aptitude 
test), there are some inherent school level practices that moderate or intensify these eff ects in urban 
settings. However, due to the fi xed eff ect estimation strategy we are unable to disentangle system 
level eff ects.
In Table 5, we report the regression results (visualisation of the results can be seen in Appendix 5), 
testing the eff ect of school level admission policy to the size of FBE. The only statistically signifi cant 
eff ect we were able to fi nd was related to the school level admission policy — admission based 
on academic record. We fi nd that it intensifi es the family background eff ect. Admission based on 
academic record is mainly an urban phenomenon, but it is clear from the regression results that this 
explains only a part of the ‘urban phenomenon’ — the diff erence between urban and rural FBEs. Thus, 
Table 4: Family background eff ects in rural and urban regions in Russia and Estonia. Regression 3: 
diff erent FBE by urban regions
Family background
 books hisced
FBE (linear eff ect) 0.203*** 0.211***
 (0.0124) (0.0192)
FBE_russian_urban 0.0355 0.215***
 (0.0276) (0.0532)
FBE_estonian_urban 0.0984*** -0.0393
 (0.0276) (0.0440)
russian_urban 0.304** -0.113
 (0.111) (0.146)
estonian_urban -0.0636 0.387***
 (0.111) (0.105)   
N 9536 9522
R² 0.246 0.205   
Notes: Country fi xed eff ect regression, dependent variable is standardised PISA 2012 reading score, school robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Control variables: gender, age at ISCED1, language at home, immigrant status, test 
language. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: authors’ compilation
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there is still some urban-rural mechanism that, independently from school-level admission policy, 
runs the FBEs.
In general, we explain approximately 5% of the total urban eff ect by including admission policy 
variable. It is also worth mentioning that such a policy has no statistically signifi cant eff ect on the 
student PISA scores, and this contradicts one of the arguments made for tracking (Braga et al., 2013).
Conclusions
The paper aimed to reveal the potential eff ects of an increasingly selective educational agenda on 
educational inequality. The latter was operationalised as the family background eff ect, while the proxy 
for the selectivity of educational systems is the schools’ tendency to admit students by academic 
record. The latter was considered one of the characteristics that has an eff ect on educational inequality 
independent of country-level school choice policy characteristics. 
Although geographical assignment (catchment area or zone-based) is still the main approach in 
assigning children to schools, there is a major trend, involving diff erent tracking systems and post-
Soviet countries, to give parents choices beyond their local neighbourhood school. Furthermore, it is 
not a new phenomenon in countries such as Estonia and Russia. Our narrow focus is on admission 
based on ability tests or previous academic records, either at the primary level or the lower secondary 
level of the school, while in Russia selecting students for primary school is prohibited. Because choice 
is mainly an urban phenomenon, we separated urban and rural school districts and measured SES-
based eff ects on educational outcomes in both countries — Russia and Estonia. Moreover, we asked 
whether a bigger urban family background eff ect is explainable by admission policies applied at the 
school level. 
Table 5: School level admission policy and family background eff ect. Regression 4: Intensifying eff ect 
of academic record based admission
Family background
 books hisced
FBE (linear eff ect) 0.166*** 0.162***
 (0.0161)   (0.0261)   
FBE_russian_urban 0.0304 0.215***
 (0.0267)  (0.0534)   
FBE_estonian_urban 0.0651* -0.0709   
  (0.0273) (0.0436)   
FBE_school_admission_policy  0.0467*** 0.0540*  
 (0.0135) (0.0218)   
School admission policy -0.0925 -0.0594   
 (0.0520) (0.0468)   
russian_urban 0.294** -0.147   
  (0.107) (0.146)   
estonian_urban  0.0138 0.427***
  (0.0996)  (0.107)   
N 9521 9507
R² 0.250 0.208   
Notes: Country fi xed eff ect regression, dependent variable is standardised PISA 2012 reading score, school robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  Control variables: gender, age at ISCED1, language at home, immigrant status, 
test language. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: authors’ compilation
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We see that the family background eff ect is detectable in all various specifi cations of our empirical 
model with various single- and multidimensional operationalisations of family background. This 
indicates that family characteristics have a strong explanatory power in explaining inequality of 
educational returns in our case countries. Thus, we determine that the dependency of students’ 
results on parental characteristics is present in both case countries, Russia and Estonia, while urban 
schools generate less social mobility, as family background eff ects are higher. In addition to the 
empirical evidence that the urban family background eff ect is bigger than the rural one, we reveal that 
the Russian urban family background eff ect overshadows the Estonian urban eff ect size signifi cantly 
(see Figure 2). However, eff ects work through diff erent channels, thus weakening the argument. This 
means that in Russia, the eff ect works through the highest educational category of the family member 
and in Estonia through books at home. The interpretation of this empirical fact remains open. We 
may speculate based on theoretical literature that in post-Soviet Estonia books are proxies of the 
cultural capital of the family, which is not necessarily the case in Russia. What the exact mechanisms 
behind this phenomenon are remains hidden, but our results confi rm that other family background 
proxies such as composite indices of home possessions or socioeconomic status, excluding wealth, 
also remain signifi cant. However, the interpretation of eff ect sizes related to these indices is complex 
due to the nature of the principal component nature of indices.
Moreover, it has to be stressed that in a comparative European context both countries perform 
relatively well, and family background eff ects are small. Estonia does well even when compared to 
Scandinavian fl agships of educational equity (Põder et al. 2016).
Mostly we focused on the explanations of why the family background eff ect is much higher in urban 
areas. Our partial explanation is related to school admission policies. Schools that admit students by 
academic record also create higher family background eff ects, while this school level admission policy 
is an urban phenomenon that partly explains the urban-rural gap. In general, our results showed 
that school level admission policy has an intensifying eff ect on family background independently of 
the country. Moreover, independently of the country, the intensifying eff ect of admission policy by 
academic record is the same.
0
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family background 
0
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FBE in urban Russia
FBE in rural Russia
FBE in urban Estonia
FBE in rural Estonia
Figure 2: Family background eff ects are measured by standardised PISA reading scores (mean=0, std.
dev=1), country fi xed eff ects
Note: Family background categories for Estonia: 1=0-25 books, 2=26-100 books, 3=101-200 books, 
4=more than 200 books. Family background categories for Russia: 1 = ISCED 1, 2; 2=ISCED 3, 4; 3=ISCED 
5b, 4 = ISCED 5a, 6.
Source: authors’ compilation
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In the interpretation of our results, we want to draw attention to certain limitations originating 
from the data and estimation strategy. Namely, the single-dimensional measure of family background 
(instead of the multidimensional nature of socioeconomic status) will not allow for the monitoring 
of whether admission policy has any eff ect on alternative features of socioeconomic background 
(controls in our analysis), e.g., immigration status, home language or similar. In addition, we showed 
that in Russia at the system level there is more external control, making this more similar to controlled 
choice policy, which according to the literature shows better results in terms of educational inequality. 
However, the empirical analyses revealed that Russia has a relatively high family background eff ect 
in urban areas compared to rural ones. One potential explanation behind this is the magnitude of 
selectivity in urban settings — in Russia the share of specialised character schools is almost 30% of all 
schools, while in Estonia the share of oversubscribed schools is barely 10%. And even though admission 
to this group of schools is highly competitive and selective (see Põder and Lauri 2013), this does not 
cause too much harm in terms of average educational inequality. In addition, we have not verifi ed 
whether any system level policy has an eff ect on equity; instead, we indicated that, independently of 
country level school choice policies, admission by academic record has a segregating eff ect in terms 
of increasing the family background eff ect.
To put our empirical results in the context of school choice literature, we have shown that 
similarly to the theoretical and empirical arguments, school choice is mainly an urban phenomenon, 
as schools in urban areas report having more competitive pressure and urban schools have higher 
family background eff ects. This pattern also works in the post-Soviet realm, as our case countries 
revealed. However, it turned out that the country level characteristics of school choice policy do not 
necessarily have the ability to predict the educational outcome in terms of the family background 
eff ect.
The main contribution of our analysis is at least three-fold. First, it illuminates school choice 
trajectories in countries of diff erent regions to emphasise the path-dependent character of school 
systems. Thus, it gives new narrative to the literature. Second, there is a gap in empirical research 
in post-Soviet education reforms and paths, to which our research contributes. Third, our research 
emphasises that school choice and its related educational outcomes are complex — diff erent 
governance layers interact and cannot easily be disentangled by normative policy design.
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Appendix 1: PISA reading scores (actual values) and socio-economic status of parents
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Appendix 3: Operationalisation of family background: multiple possibilities to operationalise SES
 Russian Estonian
 Urban Rural Urban Rural
% of students with books at home     
0-10 7 12 6 10
11-25 17 24 12 14
26-100 33 35 27 34
101-200 18 16 22 20
201-500 16 10 22 15
more than 500 10 5 11 8
ESCS (average) 0.1 –0.26 0,39 0.03
% of students with father ISCED 5A-6 46 24 33 17
% of students with mother ISCED 5A-6 52 32 45 26
Highest  parental education (years) 14.2 13.7 14.6 13.9
Home educational resources (HEDRES) 0.48 0.3 0.37 0.26
Home posessions (HOMEPOS) –0.06 –0.39 0.27 0.05
Family wealth (WEALTH) –0.59 –0.85 –0.1 –0.21
Highest parental occupational status (HISEI) 56.3 49,3 57.1 48.9
Immigrants (% of students) 11.5 10.7 10.3 7.1
Note: There are statsitically signifi cant (in 99% level) diff erences by countries but most cases there is even bigger 
statistically signifi cant diff erences by rural-urban dimention
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Appendix 4: Non-linearity of family background
 Family background
 hisced escs books
isced 3, 4 0.289***
 (0.0824)
isced 5B 0.322***
 (0.0830)
isced 5A, 6 0.712***
 (0.0849)
FB (escs) 0.349***
 (18.56)
FB (escs) squared -0.00210
 (-0.14)
11-25 books 0.200***
 (5.38)
26-100 books 0.456***
 (12.69)
101-200 books 0.644***
 (15.32)
201-500 books 0.912***
 (19.84)
more than 500 books 0.897***
 (15.18)   
russian_urban 0.410*** 0.376*** 0.414***
 (0.0714) (5.59) (5.88)   
estonian_urban 0.294*** 0.235** 0.291***
 (0.0753) (3.26) (4.07)
gender -0.489*** -0.502*** -0.452***
 (0.0205) (-24.78) (-22.43)
age_at _isced1 -0.215*** -0.198*** -0.203***
 (0.0266) (-7.77) (-7.76)
lang_athome 0.487*** 0.435*** 0.420***
 (0.0637) (7.04) (7.03)
immig -0.172*** -0.168*** -0.172***
 (0.0337) (-5.31) (-5.28)
testlang 0.647*** 0.524*** 0.531***
 (0.0707) (7.91) (7.90)   
N 9522 9562 9536
R² 0.2080 0.2360 0.2453
Notes: dependent variable is standardised PISA 2012 reading score, school robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Appendix 5: Eff ect sizes and admission policy
male
age at ISCED1
language at home same as test language
books
immigration status
test language is national language
est=0, rus=1
russian_urban
estonian_urban
books_estonia_urban
books_russia_urban
admission by academic record
books_policy
highest educational level of parents
hisced_estonia_urban
hisced_russia_urban
hisced_policy
_cons
–0.5 0 0.5 1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
FBE books FBE education
